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Introduction
The sole issue on appeal is whether the term "employees" in the Utah
Public Transit District Act refers to supervisors, and therefore provides
supervisors the right to bargain collectively. Utah Code§ 17B-2a-813(2)(a).
In the opening brief, UTA demonstrated that the Utah Legislattue in 1969
used the term" employees" in the Utah Public Transit District Act to refer to the
same class of workers who had collective bargaining rights under federal law. As
the Utah Legislature put it, the Utah Public Transit District Act established only
those "rights, benefits, and other employee protective conditions and remedies of
Section 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, ... as determined by
the Secretary of Labor ...." Id. § 17B-2a-813(1).
Because the Utah Public Transit District Act extended collective bargaining
rights to those workers who had collective bargaining rights under federal law in
1969, the issue before this court hinges upon whether supervisors had collective
bargaining rights under federal law in 1969. And as UTA demonstrated in the
opening brief, supervisors had no collective bargaining rights under federal law
in 1969, and, therefore, supervisors have no collective bargaining rights under
the Utah Public Transit District Act. This avoids what the district court
recognized as the anomalous result that UTA supervisors "may very well be the
only supervisors in the United States with the right to organize and collectively
bargain." [R.287 at n.2.]
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In the response brief, the Teamsters do not respond to this straightforward
argument. Below is each point raised by the Teamsters and why it fails:
• The Teamsters assert that the issue is moot. [Resp. Br. at 8-10.] But
the district court order continues to allow the UTA supervisors to
hold elections to attempt to unionize, a right they would not have if
this court reverses. The issue is not moot.
• The Teamsters assert that the Utah Public Transit District Act is state
law, not federal law. [Resp. Br. at 12.] This is correct but beside the
point. The Utah Legislature can enact a statute with the same scope
as a federal statute. That is what happened here.
• The Teamsters assert that the Utah Legislature has authority to
provide more protection than federal law. [Resp. Br. at 14.] This is
correct but also beside the point. While the Utah Legislature has
authority to provide more protection, it did not do so here.

In the opening brief, UTA next demonstrated-as an independent ground
to reverse -that, even if the Utah Public Transit District Act uses the term
"employees" as it is used in the Utah Labor Relations Act (''ULRA"), supervisors
still have no right to bargain collectively. It is undisputed that the term
11

employees" under the ULRA has the same meaning as that term had in the

National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). And while it was unclear for a number
of years whether the NLRA provided collective bargaining rights to supervisors,
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in 1947, in response to Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947),
Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Amendments and clarified that the NLRA
never provided collective bargaining rights to supervisors.
Because the Taft-Hartley Amendments in 1947 operated as a clarification
of the NLRA, rather than a substantive change to the NLRA, the NLRA has
always excluded supervisors from its scope. And because the NLRA has always
excluded supervisors from its scope, the ULRA also has always excluded
supervisors from its scope. The clarification to federal law in 1947 informed the
Utah Legislature that it did not need to amend the ULRA to exclude supervisors
from its scope. Therefore, even if the Utah Public Transit District Act used the
term "employees" as it is used in the ULRA, supervisors have no right to bargain
collectively.

In the response brief, the Teamsters do not respond to this straightforward
argument either. Below is each point raised by the Teamsters and why it fails:
• The Teamsters assert that UT A ignores controlling precedent by
citing the dissenting opinion in Packard. [Resp. Br. at 22-23.] But

Packard is not controlling. In clarifying the NLRA with the TaftHartley Amendments, Congress stated that the dissenting opinion
correctly held that the NLRA has never provided collective
bargaining rights to supervisors. The dissenting opinion correctly
articulates the law.
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• The Teamsters assert that legislative history is irrelevant to
interpreting unambiguous statutes. [Resp. Br. at 26-28.] This is
correct but beside the point. Under federal law in 1947, the
legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Amendments was relevant to
determining whether those amendments clarified or changed the
law. The test for whether a statute is clarifying under federal law
looks to whether Congress considered it to be clarifying, which
makes legislative history relevant.
• The Teamsters assert that, under current Utah law, the Taft-Hartley
Amendments would be deemed substantive changes, not clarifying
amendments. [Resp. Br. at 29-30.] This is correct but beside the point.
The question of whether the Taft-Hartley Amendments were
clarifying is governed by federal law in 1947, not current Utah law.
• The Teamsters assert that UTA's efforts to have the Utah Legislature
fix the problem created by the district court's order undermines
UTA's position on appeal. [Resp. Br. at 30.] But those efforts were
premised upon the erroneous order, not the correct interpretation of
the statute. The lobbying efforts are irrelevant to the merits on
appeal, but they do confirm that the issue is hardly moot.
This court should reverse.
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Argument
1.

The Issue Presented Is Not Moot Because the District Court's Order
Allows UTA Supervisors to Attempt to Unionize at Any Time

The Teamsters assert that the issue is moot because the rail operations
supervisors held a secret ballot election and voted not to unionize, and "[t]he
Union's loss of the election ternunated the controversy between the parties."
[Resp. Br. at 8.] The Teamsters also assert "[t]here is no current organizing
campaign with the Rail Operations Supervisors." [Resp. Br. at 8.]
But these statements do not render the issue moot. An issue is moot only
"if the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants," meaning

"the controversy is eliminated such that it renders the relief requested impossible
or of no legal effect." State v. Steed, 2015 UT 76,

iJ 6,357 P.3d 547 (alteration and

internal quotation marks omitted). The Teamsters cannot demonstrate that the
supervisors will not again attempt to unionize under the right to do so declared
in the district court's order. [R.290,697-98.]

In fact, under federal law the supervisors could attempt to unionize at any
time: "[n]o election shall be directed in any bargaining unit or any subdivision
within which in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election shall have
been held." 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3). Under Utah law, there are no restrictions on the
frequency of a bargaining unit's holding an election. The supervisors' last
election was held September 13, 2016. [R.675.] Under the district court's current
ruling, the supervisors could hold another election any day. [R.277-78,294.]
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Because the supervisors could attempt to unionize under the district
court's order, the controversy between the parties remains alive. To state it
plainly, if this court reverses the order of the district court, then the supervisors
will not be allowed to initiate a new election to unionize. The requested relief,
therefore, will affect the legal rights of the litigants.
And the issue could not have become moot based upon the fact that the
Teamsters are not currently pursuing an election. [Resp. Br. at 8.] The "voluntary
cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of power to
hear and determine the case, i.e., does not make the case moot." Cty. of Los

Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625,631 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). Said
differently, "a party should not be able to evade judicial review ... by
temporarily altering questionable behavior." City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of

Waukesha, 531 U.S. 278,284 n.1 (2001). Thus, "[w]hen a party moots a case by
voluntarily changing its own conduct, [a court should] view mootness ·
arguments with suspicion because the offending party might otherwise resume
that conduct as soon as the case is dismissed." N.M. ex rel. Richardson v. BLM, 565
F.3d 683, 701 (10th Cir. 2009).
This court continues to have jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue presented
on appeal because its decision will determine whether UTA supervisors continue
to have the legal right to attempt to unionize. The issue presented is not moot.
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2.

The Utah Public Transit District Act Defines 11Employees" as Federal
Labor Law Defined that Term in 1969
In the opening brief, UTA first demonstrated that the Utah Legislature in

1969 used the term "employees" in the Utah Public Transit District Act to refer to
the same class of workers who then had collective bargaining rights under
federal law. [Op. Br. at 11-17.] Because the Utah Public Transit District Act
extended collective bargaining rights only to those workers who had collective
bargaining rights under federal law in 1969, the issue before the court hinges
upon whether supervisors had collective bargaining rights under federal law in
1969. But it is undisputed that supervisors had no collective bargaining rights
under federal law in 1969. Therefore, supervisors have no collective bargaining
rights under the Utah Public Transit District Act.

In response, the Teamsters assert that Utah labor law controls. [Resp. Br. at
12-15.] On this point, all parties agree. As the Tenth Circuit noted in Burke v.
Utah Transit Authority & Local 382, "the 'legislative history [of the Urban Mass

Transit Act] indicates that eongress intended collective bargaining agreements to
be governed by state law applied in state courts."' 462 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 2006)
(alteration omitted) (quoting Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285, Amalgamated
Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15, 29 (1982)). UTA agrees.

But the issue is not whether Utah law governs. It does. The issue is
whether Utah law adopted a term used in federal law. Instead of looking to
federal law for the meaning of "employees," however, the Teamsters assert that

7
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the court should look only to a dictionary to conclude that an employee is any
11

person who works for another person or business in return for salary, wages, or

other compensation." [Resp. Br. at 16 (quoting The American Heritage Desk
Dictionary).] The Teamsters' argument ignores the fact that, when interpreting a
statute, this court gives II effect to the legislature's intent." Carranza v. United

States, 2011 UT 80, ,r 8, 267 P.3d 912 (internal quotation marks omitted). And that
intent is discerned not just from the isolated term in q dictionary definition, but
that language in context. Olsen v. Eagle Mountain CihJ, 2011 UT 10,

,r 9 & n.3, 248

P.3d465.

In particular, when interpreting Utah statutes modeled on federal statutes,
"[t]his Court has previously adopted federal interpretations for sections of the
Utah Code which are identical to or copied after federal acts." W Coating, Inc. v.

Gibbons & Reed Co., 788 P.2d 503, 505-06 (Utah 1990). "A cardinal rule of statutory
construction says that a legislature's use of an established legal term of art
incorporates the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the
body of learning from which it was taken." Utah Stream Access Coalition v. Orange

St. Dev., 2017 UT 82, ,r 21, _

P.3d _

(internal quotation marks omitted).

To interpret the Utah Public Transit District Act, then, this court should
look to the Urban Mass Transportation Act on which the Utah statute is
modeled. And as presented in UTA's opening brief, the Urban Mass Transit Act
uses the same definitions as the NLRA in 1964. [Op. Br. at 11-19.] And the NLRA
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in 1964 expressly excluded "supervisors" as "employees" for collective
bargaining purposes.
Furthermore, as argued in UT A's opening brief, the Utah Legislature and
courts have distinguished between "employees" and "supervisors" as a subset of
employers, in both workers compensation and collective bargaining settings.
[Op. Br. at 45-51.] The Teamsters respond that Utah has adopted a broad
definition of" employee," pointing to section 17B-2a-814 of the Utah Code and
two cases. Neither section 17B-2a-814 nor the two cases change the result.
Section 17B-2a-814 provides that "[e]ach trustee, officer, and employee of a
public transit district is subject to the provisions of Title 67, Chapter 16, Utah
Public Officers' and Employees' Ethics Act." The Ethics Act defines a public
employee as "a person who is not a public who is employed on a full-time, parttime, or contract basis," except for "legislators or legislative employees." Id.
§ 67-16-3(12)(a). The same section defines "Legislative employee," "Legislator,"

and "Public officer." Id. § 67-16-3(9), (10), (13).The definitions in this section undercut the Teamsters' argument that the
dictionary definition of employee should govern all statutory references to the
term "employee." If there were no differences among individuals paid by the
state, or its subdivisions, everyone would be an "employee." And just as the
Ethics Act differentiates between classes of individuals paid by the state and its
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subdivisions, Utah labor law and case law differentiates between employers and
employees. [Op. Br. at 45-51.] Section 17B-2a-814 is beside the point.
The two cases cited by the Teamsters are also off topic. First, Weber County-

Ogden City Relief Committee v. Industrial Commission of Utah was a workers'
compensation case in which the court determined whether a worker hired and
supervised by the city, but paid by the state's treasury, was a city employee. 71
P.2d 177, 180-82 (Utah 1937). The issue was whether the employee was eligible
for workers' compensation. The workers' compensation act includes a broad
definition of "employee" to protect every worker who might be injured or killed
in the course of employment. Id. at 183. For that reason, that act includes
everyone, even the Governor:
[The statute] defines the words "employee,"
"workman," and "operative" to mean: "(1) Every
elective and appointive officer, and every other person,
in the service of the state, or of any county, city, town or
district board of education within the state, serving the
state, county, city, town or district board of education
therein under any election or appointment, or under
any contract of hire, express or implied, written or
oral."

Id. at 183-84. 1 But unlike the statutes governing workers' compensation, the Utah
Public Transit District Act distinguishes among employees. And because
employees are distinguished from employers for purposes of collective
bargaining, the broadest possible definition of employee cannot apply.
The statute has some limitations, excluding employers with fewer than three
employees and independent contractors. Utah Code§ 42-1-40 (1933).
1
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Second, the Teamsters' reliance on Palmer v. Davis is unavailing. 808 P.2d
128 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). This is another workers' compensation case.
Ms. Palmer's minor son was injured by a co-worker while working as a ranch
hand. Id. at 130-31. Ms. Palmer had signed a release of claims against other
employees, but argued that the release did not preclude her claim against the coworker because the co-worker was not an employee. Id. at 130. The court of
appeals qisagreed and held that the co-worker was an ~mployee. Id. In doing so,
II

it also relied on the broadest definition of employee."
Black's Law Dictionary defines the word "employee" as
[a] person in the service of another under any contract
of hire, express or implied, oral or written, where the
employer has the power or right to control and direct
the employee in the material details of how the work is
performed." Black's Law Dictionary 471 (5th ed. 1979).
This definition was echoed by the Utah Supreme Court
in Western Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Marchant, 615 P.2d 423,
426 (Utah 1980), in which the court stated that [i]n
general, it can be said that an employee is one who is
hired for compensation, for a substantial period of time,
to perform duties wherein he is subject to a
comparatively high degree of direction and control by
the one who hires him."
11

11

Id.
The Teamsters' use of these broad definitions from other statutes ignores
the different context relevant to the interpretation of the Utah Public Transit
District Act. Workers' compensation protects all workers, whether they be the
president or the receptionist. As explained in the opening brief, labor relations
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statutes distinguish between management and those workers they manage, i.e.,
employees and employers. [Op. Br. at 45-51.]
When the court interprets the Utah Public Transit District Act in context,
supervisors are not employees with collective bargaining rights. 2 In that Act, the
Utah Legislature extended to public transit workers only those rights they then
had under federal law. It is undisputed that supervisors lacked collective
bargaining rights under federal law in 1969. Thus, the Utah Public Transit
District Act did not extend collective bargaining rights to supervisors. This court
should reverse.
3.

The Utah Public Transit District Act Does Not Adopt the Definition of
"Employees" in the ULRA, but Even if It Did, the Result Is the Same
The Teamsters argue that this court should look to the ULRA - not the

Urban Mass Transportation Act and the NLRA- to interpret the Utah Public
Transit District Act. [Resp. Br. at 20.] For reasons outlined above, the Utah Public
Transit District Act unambiguously adopts the same definition of "employees" as
that term had under federal labor law in 1969. And at that time, federal labor law
unambiguously excluded supervisors from the definition of "employees."
In passing, the Teamsters assert that the rail operations supervisors have a
first amendment right to organize and participate in a labor union. [Resp. Br. at
18.] The cases they cite note that there is not an affirmative obligation on the
government to listen to, respond to, or recognize the organization. The
Teamsters, however, argue that section 17B-2a-813(2)(c)(i) requires UTA to
bargain with any labor organization that represents a majority of employees in a
particular unit. This is a circular argument that assumes the Teamsters are correct
about the very issue before the court-i.e., whether supervisors are "employees."
The First Amendment assertions add nothing to the arguments before the court.
2
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But even if the Utah Public Transit District Act adopted the definition in
the ULRA, the Teamsters recognize that, because the ULRA was patterned on the
NLRA, this court should look to the NLRA to understand the ULRA. [Resp. Br.
at 21-22.] The Teamsters accuse UTA of relying on "dubious legislative history
and minority opinions" in interpreting the NLRA, [Resp. Br. at 23], when in fact
UT A is providing a more complete history of the NLRA.
First, Teamsters accuse UTA of "ignor[ing] the majority opinion" and
focusing only on the dissent in Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485
(1947). [Resp. Br. at 23.] But in its opening brief, UTA presented a full description
of the majority opinion in Packard. [Op. Br. at 26-27.] UTA also described the
arguments of the dissent. [Op. Br. at 27-28.]
The Teamsters fail to recognize that UTA uses the dissent to "justify [its]
position," [Resp. Br. at 23], because it was the dissent' s interpretation of the term
"employee" that Congress described as the correct interpretation in the TaftHartley Amendments to the NLRA. Pub L. No. 80-101, 61. Stat. 136 (1947). That
is, the Taft-Hartley Amendments clarified that Congress never intended to define
"employees" to include supervisors, just as Justice Douglas suggested in his
dissent. 3 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (Supp. 1 (1947)) (original codification of TaftHartley Amendments to the NLRA excluding supervisors from definition of

Congress moved to clarify Packard almost immediately after its release. [Op.
Br. at 29.] The Taft-Hartley Amendments were codified-over President
Truman's veto-only three-and-one-half months later. [Op. Br. at 34.]
3
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"employee"), with Packard, 330 U.S. at 499 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (explaining
that Congress did not intend to include supervisors in the definition of
"employee"). The majority opinion in Packard is not controlling.
The Teamsters next assert that the majority position in Packard-that
supervisors are "employees" - applies to the interpretation of the ULRA because
courts before and since Packard have interpreted the term "employee" to have
"no limit." [Resp. Br. at 23-24.] But the cases cited by Teaµ,.sters are inapposite.

NLRB v. Skinner & Kennedy Stationery Co., 113 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1940), and
American Steel Foundries v. NLRB, 158 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1946) both predate and
II

are consistent with Packard. Their analyses of the term employee" are not
particularly meaningful given Congress' clarification in response to Packard in
the Taft-Hartley Amendments. As a result, neither case informs the question of
II

how to interpret employee" under the ULRA.
The post-Packard case cited by the Teamsters is also unhelpful because it
does not concern supervisors. The Teamsters claim that NLRB v. Town & Country

Electric, Inc., 516 U.S. 85 (1995), "acknowledged the appropriateness of the
expansive definition of employees under the Wagner Act." [Resp. Br. at 24.] But

Town & Country did not concern supervisors, but instead addressed the question
of whether a worker could be a company's "employee" if that worker was paid
by a union to help the union organize. 516 U.S. at 87-88. In finding that such a
worker could be an employee, the court cited Packard in a string cite of cases
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supporting the proposition that the court had historically given the NLRA's
definition of" employee" "a broad, literal reading." Id. at 91-92. The same string
cite noted that the NLRA had been amended "to overrule ... Packard by
explicitly excluding ... supervisory employees." Id. at 92. Town & Country has
nothing to do with supervisors.
The Teamsters' final errors in interpreting the NLRA arise in their
argument that the Taft-Hartley Amendments did not clarify the NLRA. [Resp.
Br. at 26-32.] Specifically, the Teamsters argue that "a Court must find the
statutory language ambiguous" before considering legislative history. [Resp. Br.
II

at 26.] And because the language of the NLRA is unambiguous," UT A's
arguments regarding the import of the Taft-Hartley Amendments should be
rejected. [Resp. Br. at 26.] But like the district court, the Teamsters fail to
recognize that UTA does not rely on legislative history, but on subsequent

legislation in arguing that the Taft-Hartley Amendments clarified that Congress
II

did not intend supervisors to be employees" in the NLRA. UT A made this clear
in the opening brief. [Op. Br. at 36-39.]
11

The Teamsters also assert that [n]othing in the actual language of the Taft
Hartley amendments indicate that it was intended to clarify the Wagner Act."
[Resp. Br. at 27.] But as UTA demonstrated in its opening brief, the Taft-Hartley
Amendments qualify as clarifying amendments under the federal standard at the
time for determining whether legislation is clarifying. [Op. Br. at 42-44.] Under
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that standard, it is enough that the legislative history of that amendment
indicates an intent to clarify, as the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley
Amendments does: "[B]y this bill, Congress makes clear once more what it tried
to make clear when, in passing the act, it defined as an' employer,' not an
'employee,' any person' acting in the interest of an employer ...."' H. R. Rep.
No. 80-245, at 308 (1947). The Teamsters' assertion that the Taft-Hartley
Amendments amended the language of the NLRA is beside the point. [Resp. Br.
at 27.] Of course the Taft-Hartley Amendments amended the NLRA. The issue is
whether the amendments clarified or announced a substantive change in the law.
Under the federal test, they clarified.
The Teamsters also assert that the Taft-Hartley Amendments could not
have been clarifying because "Congress waited until 1947 to alter the definition
of 'employees.

111

[Resp. Br. at 28.] They claim that "[w]hat prompted Congress to

change the definition of 'employee' wasn't the Supreme Court's decision in

Packard," but "the election of 1946 which resulted in the Democratic Party losing
control of Congress for the first time in 16 years." [Resp. Br. at 28.] The Teamsters
offer no support for this assertion, and it is in direct contradiction to the
circumstances surrounding the passage of the Taft-Hartley Amendments and
contemporaneous statements by members of Congress.
The NLRA was enacted in 1935. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449. At the
time of its passage and immediately thereafter, the NLRB generally excluded
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supervisors from bargaining units. [Op. Br. at 24-25.] Thereafter, the NLRB began
interpreting the NLRA inconsistently, sometimes including supervisors as
11

employees," and, at other times, excluding them. 4 [Op. Br. at 25-26.] When the

United States Supreme Court finally spoke on the issue in Packard and held that
supervisors were "employees" under the NLRA, Congress responded
immediately with the Taft-Hartley Amendments. As Senator Taft explained, "[i]t
was not until 1945, after several changes in position, that the National Labor
Relations Board itself by divided vote finally decided that supervisory
employees were covered by the [NLRA]. This construction was recently upheld
by the Supreme Court in the Packard Motor Car case." S. Rep. No. 80-105, at 40910 (1947). It is therefore Packard, not some change in the political makeup of
Congress, that spurred Congress to clarify the NLRA with the Taft-Hartley
Amendments.
The Teamsters also assert that the "use of subsequent legislation [in
interpreting a statute] has also been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court." [Resp.
Br. at 29.] UTA addressed this argument in its opening brief, admitting that
clarifying amendments are not controlling under Utah law. [Op. Br. at 40.] As

The United States Supreme Court in Packard recognized the confusion.
Remarking on the "long record of inaction, vacillation and division of the
[NLRB] in applying [the NLRA] to foremen," the court said, "[i]f we were
obliged to depend upon administrative interpretation for light in finding the
meaning of the statute, the inconsistency of the Board's decisions would leave us
in the dark." 330 U.S. at 492.
4
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UTA explained, because the ULRA is copied from a federal law (the NLRA), and
this court looks to that federal law to interpret the state law, federal law controls

whether subsequent federal legislation (the Taft-Hartley Amendments) informs
the interpretation of the NLRA. [Op. Br. at 40.] If the clarifying amendment at
issue were a Utah state statute, Teamsters would be correct. But the clarifying
amendment at issue is a federal statute, and under federal law, clarifying
amendments are meaningful and apply retroactively. United States v. Montgomery
Cty., 761 F.2d 998, 1003 (4th Cir. 1985) ("[C]hanges in statutory language need

not ipso facto constitute a change in meaning or effect. Statutes may be passed
purely to make what was intended all along even more unmistakably clear.").
Finally, the Teamsters assert that the clarified meaning of "employee" does
not apply to the ULRA because "[k]nowing that the definition of employee
under the Wagner Act included supervisors, the Utah Legislature declined to
provide a 'clarifying amendment' such as Congress did with the Taft-Hartley
Amendments." [Resp. Br. at 29.] But the Teamsters fail to acknowledge that, after
the Taft-Hartley Amendments clarified federal law, Utah had no reason to
amend the ULRA to clarify that supervisors are not "employees." No Utah court
had interpreted the ULRA as the Packard majority interpreted the NLRA, so the
Utah Legislature had no need to clarify a state statute whose federal counterpart
had been clarified. Moreover, as UT A explained in the opening brief, Utah courts
consistently distinguished supervisors from employees when interpreting Utah
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labor laws before the ULRA was enacted, after the ULRA was enacted (but
before the Taft-Hartley Amendments clarified the NLRA), and after the TaftHartley Amendments were enacted. [Op. Br. at 45-47.]
Conclusion

The district court erred in its interpretation of the term "[e]mployee" in
section 17B-2a-813(2)(a) of the Utah Public Transit District Act. 5 This court should
vacate summary judgment and remand for the court to resolve the fact question
of whether UT A's rail operations supervisors are supervisors for purposes of
collective bargaining. This court should also instruct the district court, if
necessary, to order a secret ballot election rather than a card check.
DATED this 2nd day of January, 2018.
ZIMMERMAN BOOHER

Is I Troy L. Booher
Troy L. Booher
Julie J. Nelson
Erin B. Hull

Attorneys for Appellant

In the Conclusion of the opening brief, UTA erroneously cited section
34-20-2 of the Utah Code as the relevant statute. (Op. Br. at 56.) UTA should have
instead cited 17B-2a-813(2)(a).
5
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